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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20001145-CA 
SANTIAGO ACOSTA-TORRES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered judgment of conviction for Child Abuse, a 
second degree felony, on December 15, 2000. R. 109. See Judgment in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. The presentence investigator indicated that Appellant/Defendant Santiago 
Acosta-Torres ("Appellant" or "Santiago") would have been an appropriate candidate for 
probation, but because the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") planned to 
deport Santiago, the investigator recommended prison. Although the state recommended 
probation with jail followed by deportation, the trial judge was "not of the view that the 
recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate" (R. 167:7) and sentenced Santiago to 
prison. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge abused his discretion and violated 
due process, equal protection and the Supremacy Clause in sentencing Appellant to prison 
based on a recommendation of prison time because INS planned to deport Appellant. 
Preservation. This issue was preserved when defense counsel questioned the 
propriety of the prison recommendation and requested that if the trial judge were inclined 
to impose prison, defense counsel be allowed additional time to discuss the 
recommendation with the presentence investigator. R. 167:3-4. The trial court proceeded 
with sentencing and imposed a prison sentence. R. 167:109-10. Alternatively, even if 
this Court determines that the issue was not preserved below, Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) 
gives this Court authority to correct this sentence, which was imposed in an illegal 
manner. State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995); see discussion infra at 20-21. 
Standard of Review. A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion. State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). A trial court's 
discretion is not unlimited, however, and must be exercised so as to comply with 
constitutional requirements. See generally id. (trial court's discretion must be exercised 
so as to comply with due process and requirements of procedural fairness) (citing inter 
alia State v. Sweat. 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986)). The underlying constitutional issues 
are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App 
381, TJ5, n.4, 993 P.2d 894 ("[Constitutional questions . . . are questions of law and 
therefore reviewed for correctness11). 
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TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following rule and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B: 
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e); 
Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, clause 2, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The state charged Defendant/Appellant Santiago Acosta-Torres ("Appellant" or 
"Santiago") with one count of child abuse, a second degree felony, in an Information filed 
July 13, 2000. On November 13, 2000, Appellant pled guilty as charged in the 
Information. R. 82-89. On December 15, 2000, the trial judge sentenced Appellant to 
prison. R. 108. On December 23, 2000, trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. R. 111. 
The office of appellate counsel was appointed to represent Appellant on January 31, 
2001. R. 126. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case has not gone to trial. As part of his guilty plea, Appellant admitted that 
he intentionally caused serious bodily injury in the form of two or more injuries, to A.Z., 
a child under seventeen, by squeezing him. R. 166:7-8. 
According to the presentence report, three-month-old A.Z. was brought to the 
hospital emergency room on June 22,2000, by his mother, Breanne Heath, Appellant, 
and two other people. PSR:2. The baby had several bruises on his face, some trails that 
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could have been caused by finger marks from slapping, a swollen and bruised left ear, a 
partial palm print over the ear, bruising over his eyes, and finger type bruises on the left 
hip. PSR:2. 
The emergency room doctor did not believe that the injuries were consistent with 
the mother's explanation of how they occurred. PSR:2. Officers talked with the four 
people who had brought the baby into the hospital and were given various explanations 
for the baby's injuries. PSR.2. Ultimately, the officers learned that the baby was left 
alone with Santiago while the others went to the store. PSR:3; 165:5-6. When Breanne 
and the others left, A.Z. did not have any bruises or injuries. PH:6. After they returned, 
A.Z. was crying and they discovered the marks and bruises. R. 165:7. 
While being questioned by police officers, Santiago became upset and admitted 
that he had dropped the child. PSR:3. After Santiago dropped A.Z., the baby would not 
stop crying. PSR:3. According to the presentence report, Santiago told officers that in an 
effort to make the child stop crying, Santiago "'flicked' the baby on the side of his head 
with his finger approximately two times.ff PSR:3. He then acknowledged that he had 
"flicked" the child two to six times. PSR:3. 
A.Z. did not suffer any injuries other than bruising. R. 165:12. The bruising was 
not a long term injury, A.Z. did not suffer any permanent injuries, and A.Z. was doing 
very well at the time the presentence report was prepared. PSR:5. 
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Santiago was nineteen at the time of the crime. PSR: 1. He was born in Mexico, 
but moved here with his family when he was twelve. PSR: 11. He is married and has a 
daughter who was 22 months at the time of this incident. PSR: 12. Santiago left high 
school in the eleventh grade because he needed to support his wife and daughter. 
PSR: 12. He had worked at the same job for a year and a half and made $ 1500 a month 
when he was arrested. PSR: 14. 
Santiago had a number of juvenile referrals. PSR: 15. "His biggest problem as a 
juvenile, he ran away from home, so they ended up putting him in a proctor home, and 
he'd keep coming back to Court on that regard." R. 167:6. He had one adult conviction 
for misdemeanor assault. PSR: 15. 
The arresting officer reported that Santiago was not cooperative during the 
investigation of this case, but acknowledged that "in the 'grand scheme9 this is not the 
worse child abuse case." PSR:7. The officer recommended that Santiago serve at least a 
year in jail. PSR:7. 
After thoroughly reviewing Santiago's background and the circumstances of the 
crime, the presentence investigator thought that Santiago was "an appropriate candidate 
for probation after a lengthy period of jail," but recommended prison solely because INS 
planned to deport Santiago. PSR: 16. The state recommended that Santiago serve a year 
in jail, followed by deportation. R. 167:5. 
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Defense counsel challenged the propriety of sentencing a defendant to prison 
instead of probation because INS planned to deport the individual. R. 167:3-4. 
The trial judge sentenced Santiago to prison, then stated: 
Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the recommendation from 
AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child of 
this nature, in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time, and I 
am concerned that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and 
endanger some other innocent victim out in society. 
R. 167:7. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Imposing a harsher sentence based in part on a defendant's status as an illegal alien 
violates the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution. States have no role or interest 
in immigration matters, including matters related to the exclusion of illegal aliens. By 
concerning himself with whether INS intended to deport Santiago in determining the 
appropriate sentence, the trial judge overstepped into forbidden federal territory, in 
violation of the Supremacy Clause. 
The trial court also violated due process by imposing a harsher sentence based in 
part on Santiago's purported status as an illegal alien. Such a consideration is improper 
for sentencing purposes and therefore violates the due process requirement that 
sentencing decisions be based on relevant, reliable and appropriate factors. 
Imposition of a harsher sentence based in part on a defendant's purported status as 
an illegal alien likewise violates equal protection. Regardless of whether an intermediate 
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scrutiny or rational basis test is applied, the action fails because the state has no interest or 
role in the exclusion or immigration status of individuals. Since the state has no interest, 
imposition of a harsher sentence based on an individual's purported status as an illegal 
alien is not related to either a legitimate or substantial state interest. 
This issue was preserved below when defense counsel challenged the propriety of 
a recommendation for a harsher sentence based solely on Santiago's purported status as 
an illegal alien, and the trial court indicated that such a recommendation was not 
inappropriate. Even if the issue was not preserved, however, this Court can vacate this 
illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). 
Finally, this case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing in order 
to preserve the appearance that justice and fairness were served in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN 
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO PRISON BASED IN PART ON HIS 
IMMIGRATION STATUS. 
The presentence investigator and prosecutor thought that a jail sentence rather than 
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence in this case. Nevertheless, the presentence 
investigator recommended prison based solely on the fact that INS planned to deport 
Santiago. Although defense counsel challenged this recommendation, Judge Frederick 
did not believe the recommendation was inappropriate and sentenced Santiago to prison. 
In imposing a harsher sentence based at least in part on Santiago's purported status as an 
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illegal alien, the trial court violated equal protection, due process and the Supremacy 
Clause, thereby abusing his discretion in sentencing. 
A. IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED STATUS AS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN 
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS AND THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE. 
1. The Sentence Violates the Supremacy Clause. 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, dictates that 
federal law controls the exclusion and entry of aliens into the United States. Arviso, 1999 
UT App 381,1HJ5-7. "Congress has delegated authority to the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to determine whether aliens may enter [or must be deported 
from] the United States, thus designating this area of the law for federal control and 
preempting state participation." Id. at f^5. 
In Arviso, this Court concluded that the trial court violated the Supremacy Clause, 
thereby abusing its discretion, when it suspended Arviso's prison sentence based "'on 
condition [he] not return to the United States.5" Id. at [^7. This Court reasoned that M[b]y 
imposing this condition, the trial court trespassed into forbidden INS territory, violating 
the Supremacy Clause." Id at ^7. 
"The Supreme Court 'has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" 
the admission of aliens.'" State v. Pando, 122 N.M. 167, 921 P.2d 1285, 
1287 (App. 1996) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell. 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 
1478, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (citation omitted); see also State v. Camargo. 
112 Ariz. 50, 537 P.2d 920, 922 (1975) ("The federal power over aliens is 
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exclusive and supreme in matters of their deportation and entry into the 
United States."); Hernandez v. State. 613 S.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1980) ("The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens 
and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to 
the States.'" (Citation omitted.)). 
Arviso, 1999 UT App. 381, Tf6. Hence, "a court exceeds its discretion when sentencing 
'a criminal defendant in such a manner as to assume the power to control the . . . 
exclusion of aliens.'" IcL (citation omitted). 
Basing a recommendation for prison solely on Appellant's status as an alien and 
the purported plan of the INS to deport him trampled on "forbidden INS territory." 
Arviso. 1999 UT App 381, Tf7. Imposing a prison sentence based in part on a belief that 
INS planned to deport Santiago likewise involves a consideration which is not relevant to 
state court action. See id. The federal government, through the INS, is exclusively 
responsible for deportation matters, and states may not play a role in deciding whether an 
individual is deportable or otherwise involve themselves in deportation matters. Id at 
1ffl5-7. In a case such as the present one, where INS may have identified an individual as 
an alien and indicated a plan to deport that individual, the actual procedure for 
deportation is left in the hands of INS. Basing a sentence in a state case on a belief that 
the INS plans to deport the individual improperly steps into the federal immigration 
arena, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause.1 
1
 As set forth more fully infra at 12-15, when the record demonstrates an 
appearance that the sentencing was based at least in part on an unconstitutional 
consideration, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. See 
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2. The Sentence Violates Due Process. 
The state and federal due process clauses "require [] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence." 
State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985): State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 
(Utah 1993). In other words, a "judge may not consider improper, inaccurate or mistaken 
information, nor may he make unfounded assumptions or groundless inferences in 
imposing sentence." United States v. Borrero-Isaza. 887 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989). 
A sentence which is based on improper information violates due process and must be 
vacated. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75 (vacating sentence which was based on an 
unreliable hearsay report). 
A due process violation occurs when a judge sentences a defendant more harshly 
based on his status as an alien. See Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1352 (citing inter alia 
United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) for the proposition that 
"sentencing defendant more harshly because of his nationality 'obviously would be 
unconstitutional'"); United States v. Onwuemene, 933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(consideration at sentencing of defendant's status as an alien violates due process); 
Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143,145 (Nev. 1998) (considering defendant's nationality or 
ethnicity in imposing sentence violates due process); United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 
e.g. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating sentence where 
record created appearance that defendant's alien status had played a role in determining 
sentence). 
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586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (due process violated where defendant's alien status or nationality 
plays a role in sentencing). 
In Gomez, the Court recognized that illegal aliens are protected under federal due 
process and equal protection. Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419 (citing Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S. 
202,210-16 (1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1986)). The Court also 
recognized that consideration at sentencing of a defendant's status as an illegal alien 
could violate those protections. Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419. 
Due process and equal protection were not violated in Gomez, however, because 
the defendant's status as an illegal alien was tied to the crime. Id at 420. Gomez, who 
was from Columbia, illegally entered the United States and was subsequently convicted 
of drug distribution. Id at 418-19. In his sentencing comments, the judge indicated that 
he "did not mean to suggest that Mr. Gomez or people similarly situated be treated more 
harshly because of their nationality or alien status, that would obviously be 
unconstitutional." Id at 418 n. 2. The judge went on to say, however, that because of the 
economic rewards for people from Columbia who distribute illegal drugs in the United 
States and the increasing numbers of people from Latin America who are distributing 
drugs, it was important to impose a strong sentence not only for the crime, but as a 
possible deterrent. Id. 
The Seventh Circuit recognized that "[i]f misused those considerations [of 
Gomez's status as an illegal alien from a Latin American country with an illegal drug 
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reputation] could violate the constitutional protections to which aliens, including illegal 
aliens, are entitled under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 419. Nevertheless, 
the court held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing because "[t]he 
nationality of Gomez, and his illegal entry and entrance into the illicit drug business, are 
too related to be artificially separated for sentencing purposes." Id. at 420. 
The Ninth Circuit in Borrero-Isaza clarified that while a focus on the source 
country may be appropriate for sentencing in some cases, a focus on the defendant's 
national origin or alien status is never appropriate. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1355-56. 
Because the sentencing judge "partially based the sentence on Borrero's national origin," 
the sentence violated due process and was vacated. Id. at 1355. 
In the present case, the presentence investigator recommended prison based solely 
on Santiago's status as an illegal alien. PSR:16. Santiago's status did not relate to the 
underlying crime; the rationale of Gomez that consideration of the source country can be 
an appropriate factor in sentencing in a drug case therefore does not apply to this case. 
The recommendation of a harsher sentence because the defendant is purportedly an illegal 
alien violated due process in this case where that status was not linked to the crime. 
Although defense counsel challenged the propriety of sentencing Santiago more 
harshly based on his immigration status (R. 167:4), Judge Frederick nevertheless appears 
to have sentenced Santiago at least in part based on his status as an illegal alien. Despite 
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the recommendation of the state that Santiago not be imprisoned, Judge Frederick 
sentenced Santiago to prison, then stated: 
Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the recommendation 
from AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child 
of this nature, in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time, 
and I am concerned that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again 
and endanger some other innocent out in society. 
I'm therefore of the view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you ought to be 
committed to the Utah State Prison, and I'll order that be accomplished 
forthwith. 
R. 167:7-8. 
While the follow-up sentences suggest that the prison sentence was based in part 
on the nature of the crime, the judge's initial sentence explicitly states that the AP&P 
recommendation was not inappropriate. Since defense counsel had just addressed the 
impropriety of this recommendation, the trial judge's statement that the recommendation 
was not inappropriate should be taken at face value as a determination that basing the 
sentence on Santiago's status as an illegal alien is acceptable. Moreover, because the 
presentence investigator's recommendation is based solely on Santiago's status as an 
illegal alien, the judge's acceptance of that recommendation necessarily encompasses a 
determination that the recommendation, including the basis for the recommendation, is 
sound. 
In addition, the remainder of the information relevant to sentencing weighs heavily 
in favor of probation with jail rather than a prison sentence. The prosecutor 
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recommended jail rather than prison, and the presentence investigator indicated that but 
for Santiago's status as an alien, probation with a jail sentence, not prison, would have 
been recommended. Although Judge Frederick indicated that the circumstances of the 
crime also figured into his sentence, the circumstances of this crime, while unpleasant, do 
not rise to an egregious level calling for a prison sentence of one to fifteen years. In fact, 
the investigating officer recognized that "in the 'grand scheme5 this is not the worse child 
abuse case; however, if a prison sentence is not imposed, the defendant should at least 
serve one year in jail.1' PSR:7. The record as a whole therefore demonstrates that the 
improper consideration of Santiago's immigration status played a role in sentencing. 
Where the record creates at least an appearance that the sentencing judge partially 
based his decision on the defendant's status as an alien, due process is violated, requiring 
that the sentence be vacated and a new sentencing hearing be held. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 
586-87 (vacating sentence where "appearance of justice" was not satisfied since record 
created the appearance that defendant's "ethnicity and alienage status played a role in 
determining her sentence"); Borrero-Isaza. 887 F.2d at 1355 (vacating sentence on due 
process grounds after pointing out, "[a]fter a careful review of the record, we are left with 
the overriding impression that the district court partially based sentence on Borrero's 
national origin"); Onwuemene. 933 F.2d at 652 (vacating sentence on constitutional 
grounds where one of the factors relied on by the sentencing judge was the defendant's 
status as an alien, stating "[b]ecause we cannot say that the district court would have 
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imposed the same sentence absent this impermissible consideration, we must vacate 
Onwuemene's sentence and remand for resentencing"); Martinez. 961 P.2d at 145-46 
(vacating sentence on due process grounds where there was an appearance that the judge 
improperly relied on the defendant's alienage in imposing sentence, even though the court 
could not determine from the record that the judge actually relied on that improper 
factor); see generally Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1074 (vacating sentence and remanding for 
resentencing where one of the factors considered by the judge at sentencing was improper 
and violated due process). In this case where the record creates at least the appearance 
that the trial judge relied at least in part on Santiago's status as an alien in imposing 
sentence, due process was violated. 
3. The Sentence Violates Equal Protection. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects ff[a]liens, even 
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful." Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S, 202, 210 
(1982); see also Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419. That Clause requires that laws be applied 
equally to all persons regardless of their alienage. Kalbali v. State. 636 P.2d 369, 370 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (quoting Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n.. 334 U.S. 410 
(1948)). 
Courts apply three levels of scrutiny when analyzing whether state action violates 
equal protection. First, when a suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, 
courts employ a strict scrutiny test. State. Dept. of Revenue v. Cosio. 858 P.2d 621, 626 
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(Alaska 1993). Pursuant to the strict scrutiny test, the state must demonstrate that the 
state action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Plyler. 457 U.S. at 
217. Second, when "quasi-suspect" classifications are involved, courts employ an 
intermediate scrutiny test under which the government must show that the state action 
bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. Id. at 218; Cosio, 
858 P.2d at 626 (citation omitted). Third, all other classifications are reviewed under a 
rational basis test. IcL Pursuant to the rational basis test, the state must demonstrate that 
the challenged action is rationally related to achieving a legitimate state interest. 
Without clarifying the level of scrutiny being applied, the court held in Kalbali that 
"the refusal of the trial court to consider granting a defendant a deferred or suspended 
sentence, solely because he is a foreign national, is a violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and invidiously 
discriminates between an alien and a citizen." Kalbali, 636 P.2d at 371. 
Shortly after the decision in Kalbali, the United States Supreme Court applied an 
intermediate scrutiny test in assessing whether a statute which allowed school districts to 
deny enrollment to children who were illegal aliens and withheld funds for educating 
such children violated Equal Protection. Plyler. 457 U.S. at 224. The Court held that the 
state failed to show that denying children who are illegally in the United States a free 
public education was justified by a substantial state interest. Id. at 230. The statute 
therefore violated equal protection. 
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Some equal protection decisions following Plyler have suggested that the use of 
the intermediate scrutiny test in cases involving illegal aliens might be limited to 
circumstances similar to those in Plyler where state action interferes with the access by 
children to education. See e.g. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 627. For example, in Cosio, the court 
stated: 
Plyler indicates that the Court's increased scrutiny cannot be 
attributed solely to the fact that the challenged law burdened illegal aliens. 
Rather, the Court offered two important reasons for subjecting the Texas 
law to higher scrutiny: 
[(1) The state law] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of 
children not accountable for their disabling status. [(2)] The stigma of 
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these 
children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the 
structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that 
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. 
Cosio. 858 P.2d at 627 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223). While increased scrutiny is 
undoubtedly required when assessing whether state action precludes access by illegal 
aliens to education, preserving the due process rights of illegal aliens and providing them 
with a fair proceeding before depriving them of their freedom is an equally important 
reason for requiring intermediate scrutiny. Just as depriving children of education creates 
a lifetime hardship and stigma, sentencing someone to prison who would otherwise be 
placed on probation creates lifelong impact and a stigma. Accordingly, intermediate 
scrutiny as employed in Plyler should apply in this case. Even if intermediate scrutiny 
were not applied, however, equal protection requires at the very least that the trial court's 
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action in sentencing Santiago more harshly based on his status as an illegal alien be 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 
Regardless of whether the intermediate scrutiny or rational basis test is applied, 
sentencing Santiago to prison based on his status as an illegal alien violates equal 
protection because it does not serve a state interest, substantial or otherwise. 
As set forth in Point A(l), authority to determine whether aliens must be deported 
rests with INS, and state action violates the Supremacy Clause when the state involves 
itself in immigration matters. See generally Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, TJ6 (state has no 
role in deportation matters). Accordingly, the state has no interest in deportation matters. 
When a judge sentences a defendant more harshly because EMS plans to deport him, the 
judge bases the sentencing decision on a matter in which the state has no interest. Such a 
basis for sentencing a defendant therefore is not related to a state interest, let alone a 
substantial state interest. Because the state action was not related to a state interest, it 
violated equal protection. 
In this case where the presentence investigator recommended a harsher sentence 
based on Santiago's status as an illegal alien, and the record demonstrates at least the 
appearance that Judge Frederick sentenced Santiago to prison based in part on his status 
as an illegal alien (see discussion supra at 12-15), the sentence must be vacated and the 
case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
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B. THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED FOR REVIEW; ALTERNATIVELY, 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e) ALLOWS THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE 
ISSUE. 
This issue was preserved for appellate review when defense counsel questioned the 
propriety of the recommendation that Santiago be sentenced to prison because INS 
wanted to deport him. Defense counsel stated in part: 
Defense counsel: Two sentences of that. "It should be noted the defendant 
would be considered an appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy 
jail period or a period of jail. However, this agency's options now are 
limited, knowing that INS plans on deporting the defendant,11 and then they 
recommend prison. 
I'm extremely bothered by it and I attempted to call the person that did this 
report, Stacy Smith, but she's out of the office until the 18th. I do know the 
State's planning on recommending a year in jail in this case, and I think that 
would be an appropriate resolution. 
If the Court is strongly leaning towards prison, then I'd ask for some more 
time to at least talk to the officer and get to the bottom of it. I think it's not 
a very good report in that regard. 
R. 167:4. Defense counsel's statement informed the sentencing judge that defense 
counsel believed Santiago's immigration status was an improper factor for the judge to 
consider in sentencing. While defense counsel did not state that sentencing Santiago 
more harshly on this basis violates the Supremacy Clause, due process or equal 
protection, counsel nevertheless sufficiently informed the court that this factor was not 
appropriate. Moreover, the trial court's statement that it was "not of the view that the 
recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate" suggests that the trial court understood 
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that defense counsel was arguing that this factor could not be considered for sentencing, 
but disagreed. Since defense counsel raised the issue and the judge ruled on it, the claims 
raised on appeal were adequately preserved for review. 
Alternatively, even if the claims were not preserved, this Court can correct the 
illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) states, ,f[t]he 
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any 
time.M In Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859, the Supreme Court recognized that pursuant to 
Rule 22(e), an appellate court can vacate an illegal sentence even if the claim is raised for 
the first time on appeal. Id. at 860. The Court stated: 
When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the illegal 
sentence without first remanding the case to the trial court, even if the 
matter was never raised before. This makes theoretical sense because an 
illegal sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at 
any time. This view of the matter is also supported by considerations of 
judicial economy. 
Brooks. 908 P.2d at 860. In this case, the sentence is patently illegal as set forth above. 
Rule 22(e) allows this Court to review this issue and vacate the sentence even if it 
determines that the issue was not preserved below.2 
2
 The challenge to the sentence made in this case could also be reviewed under the 
doctrines of plain error or exceptional circumstances. Plain error occurs where ll6(i) [a]n 
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful.'" State v. Adams. 2000 UT App 42, %L09 5 P.3d 642 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). An error occurred in this case since imposition of a 
harsher sentence based on Santiago's status as an illegal alien violates the Supremacy 
Clause, due process and equal protection. The error should have been obvious in light of 
Arviso since Arviso clarified that state courts have no role or interest in the deportation of 
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C. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE 
FOR RESENTENCING. 
Because of the nature of the violation and the necessity of the appearance of 
justice, some courts that have vacated a sentence which was improperly based on the 
defendant's status as an alien have remanded the case for resentencing before a different 
judge. See e ^ Leung. 40 F.3d at 587; Martinez. 961 P.2d at 146; Kalball 636 P.2d at 
371. The rationale for remanding the case to another judge for resentencing is that "the 
appearance of justice is better satisfied by assigning the resentencing to a different judge." 
Leung. 40 F.3d at 587. This concern for the appearance of justice requires reassignment 
for resentencing even when the appellate court nbelieve[s] the District Judge could fairly 
sentence on remand." Id.: see also Martinez, 961 P.2d at 146 (because court "[could] not 
conclusively determine that the district court did not improperly rely on prejudicial 
matters/1 the case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge.) In this case, 
aliens. Moreover, the trial court should have known pursuant to Johnson and other case 
law that due process requires that sentence be based on reliable, relevant and appropriate 
factors. The error was harmful since Santiago was sentenced to prison even though 
probation with jail appeared to be the more appropriate sentence. 
The doctrine of exceptional circumstances "serves as a 'safety device' to assure 
that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.'" 
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). Exceptional 
circumstances is a much less precise doctrine than plain error, "as it is a descriptive term 
used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an issue was not 
raised below and even though the plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural 
circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." Id. 
In this case where defense counsel alerted the trial judge to a concern with imposing a 
harsher sentence based on deportation status and an illegal sentence is in place, manifest 
injustice would occur if this Court were to refuse to review the issue. 
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"the appearance of justice is better satisfied by assigning the resentencing to a different 
judge" where the record demonstrates that the trial judge imposed a harsher sentence 
based at least in part on Santiago's status as an illegal alien. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 587. 
While it would be appropriate to remand this case to a different judge based solely 
on a concern for satisfying the appearance of justice, some courts also consider additional 
factors. In Borrero-Isaza, the court outlined "factors to be considered in deciding whether 
resentencing should be conducted by a different judge." Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1357. 
Those factors are: 
(1) the difficulties, if any, that the district court would have at being 
objective upon remand because of prior information received; (2) whether 
reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3) 
whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication of effort out of 
proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of justice. 
Id. Applying these factors, the court in Borrero-Isaza decided that the case did not 
require reassignment primarily because a new court "would have to review the 
voluminous pleadings and testimony in this case and make its own factual findings. This 
would entail substantial waste and duplication of effort out of proportion to any gain in 
preserving the appearance of justice." Id 
A different result is reached in this case where application of the three factors 
demonstrates that the case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing. 
Unlike Borrero-Isaza, this case does not involve "voluminous pleadings and testimony." 
Id. The district court record is very short. Moreover, the case did not involve a trial 
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since Santiago entered a guilty plea. At the plea hearing, the judge merely read the scant 
details of the crime which were included in the plea affidavit. R. 166:7-8. A new judge 
could simply read the plea affidavit and presentence report and be in the same position for 
resentencing as the original judge. Given the passage of time, the original judge would in 
all likelihood also have to review these documents prior to resentencing. Remanding the 
case to a new judge therefore would not require substantial waste or a duplication of 
efforts. Given the appearance that justice is not being served which would be created by 
remanding to the same judge, and the minimal effort required by a new judge to 
familiarize himself or herself with the information pertinent to sentencing, the Borrero-
Isaza factors weigh in favor of remanding the case to a different judge for resentencing. 
In order to preserve the appearance that Santiago received a fair and appropriate 
sentencing in this case, Appellant respectfully requests that this case be remanded to a 
different judge for resentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Santiago Acosta-Torres respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand the case for resentencing with a different judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //-tt day of June, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original 
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 
P. 0. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the Utah 
Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, P. O. Box 
140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ifi* day of June, 2001. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 




THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SANTIAGO A. ACOSTA-TORRES, 
Defendant. 




Prosecutor: HIGGINS, TRINA A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BUIVIDAS, ALAN J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 8, 1981 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:58-10:06 
CHARGES 
1. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001912118 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: December 15, 2000 
Page 1 Kn 
Case No: 001912118 
Date: Dec 15, 2000 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court grants credit for 155 days time served. The Court 
recommends defendant receive anger management therapy at the 
prison. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: 
The amount of Restitution is still to be determined. 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Pay restitution of all medical and counseling expenses incurred by 
the victim(s) in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Dated this ^ d a y of fys . J\_00 
Page 2 (last) 
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ADDENDUM B 
UTAH RULES OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, OT to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with 
the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
(0 Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment*] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 




[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of of-
fice — Religious tests prohibited.] 
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adop-
tion of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under 
this Constitution, as under the Confederation. 
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members 
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both 
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or 
Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be 
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United 
States. 
